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 Abstract 
 
Background: Patient safety culture is measured using a range of survey tools. 
Many provide limited data on psychometric properties and few report findings 
outside of the USA healthcare context. This study reports an assessment of the 
psychometric properties and suitability of the American Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture (HSOPC) for use within the UK. 
 
Methods: A questionnaire survey of three hospitals within a large UK Acute NHS 
Trust. 1,437 questionnaires were completed (37% response rate). Exploratory 
factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and reliability analyses were carried 
out to assess the psychometric performance of this survey instrument and 
explore potential improvements. 
 
Results: Reliability analysis of the items within each proposed scale showed that 
over half failed to achieve satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha < 
0.7). Furthermore, a confirmatory factor analysis carried out on the UK dataset 
achieved a poor fit when compared to the original American model. An optimal 
measurement model was then constructed via exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis with split-half sample validation, and consisted of 9 dimensions 
compared to the original 12 in the American model. 
 
Conclusion: This is one of the few studies to provide an evaluation of an 
American patient safety culture survey using data from the UK.  The results 
indicate that there is need for caution in using the HSOPC survey in the UK and 
underline the importance of appropriate validation of safety culture surveys 
before extending their usage to populations outside of the specific geographical 
and health care contexts in which they were developed. 
 
 
 
Abbreviations: 
CFI, comparative fit index; RMR, root mean square residual; RMSEA, root mean 
square error of approximation, SRMR, standardized root mean square residual; 
NNFI, Non-Normed Fit Index. 
 
 Introduction 
The measurement of patient safety culture is a growing industry amongst 
researchers and healthcare professionals 1-6. In the UK at least a third of NHS 
Trusts are taking part in some form of culture assessment7. Measurement 
methods range from more generic ‘toolkits’ through to methods designed for 
specific healthcare contexts (e.g., primary care)8,9. Questionnaire surveys are 
frequently used to measure, for example, team working, attitudes towards errors 
and general perceptions of safety. However, it has been suggested that many 
questionnaires lack explicit theoretical underpinning and fail to report the full 
psychometric properties of measures10,11, raising the possibility that they neither 
consistently measure specific aspects of patient safety, nor generalise across 
different national and healthcare-specific environments2. In this paper, we report 
the use within the UK of the American Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) sponsored Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPC) 
questionnaire.  
 
 
The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
The HSOPC questionnaire is based upon a set of pilot studies carried out in 21 
different hospitals involving 1,437 hospital staff across the USA.12 As a result of a 
series of item and content analyses, reliability analysis and exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses, it consists of 42 items which group into 12 
dimensions; 2 outcome dimensions and 10 safety dimensions. For each item 
there were 5 possible response categories, the labeling of which varies across 
dimensions. Of the 42 items, 17 are asked from a “negative” viewpoint, and are 
subsequently reverse-scored. The confirmatory factor analysis carried out during 
the development of the questionnaire indicated that the 12 factor model proposed 
had an adequate level of fit to the data using established criteria,13 specifically 
with CFI = 0.94, NNFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.04, RMR =  0.04.12 Very few published 
accounts of the use of the survey are available; however, the AHRQ have made 
 available a database which facilitates the benchmarking of findings from other 
users of the survey. The database for 2008 for example, consists of data drawn 
from 160,176 respondents across 519 hospitals in the USA14. Comparable data 
from the UK and Europe are not available, although there is evidence that the 
survey is being used within UK Trusts7. 
 
 
Method 
The sample 
The HSOPC questionnaire was distributed to three hospitals within a large NHS 
Acute Trust in the East Midlands between May-June 2006. Questionnaires were 
distributed by key staff working in wards and other specialist areas across the 
three hospitals. Clinical and non-clinical staff could freely and anonymously fill in 
the questionnaire and return their responses by post in an envelope provided. 
The project was reviewed and approved as an audit by both the Chair of the 
Local Ethics Research Committee and the Research and Development 
Department.  
 
Changes made to the questionnaire 
As a result of pre-survey group discussions with staff members, a number of 
changes were made. These included adjustments to the wording of individual 
items with respect to terminology used within UK. The words “area” and “unit” 
were changed to “ward” and “department” (affecting questions A28, A1, A7, A20, 
A12, F4, F13, F2, F7, F3, F9) and the term “adverse outcome” was used to 
substitute for “error” and “mistake” (questions D1, D2, D3, C7, C9). The words 
“over and over” in question B4 were replaced by “repeatedly”. In addition, 
following discussions with hospital management, one item (question A19) in the 
“non-punitive responses to error” dimension was removed from the questionnaire. 
Finally, due to a proof-reading error, the meaning of one item (question F1) in the 
“Hospital management support for patient safety” dimension was altered. This 
 item was subsequently discarded because of this change of meaning, resulting in 
40 items used in our data analyses as compared to 42 from the original HSOPC 
survey (table 1). The survey also collected a small amount of background 
information, specifically on respondents’ hospital, job type and tenure. 
 
 
 Table 1: Modified version of the HSOPC questionnaire 
Question 
Number 
Dimension/Item 
 Overall perceptions of safety (outcome dimension) 
A25 
A30 
A18 
A28* 
 
D1 
 
D2 
 
D3 
 
 
B1 
 
B2 
 
B3 
 
B4 
 
 
A14 
A16 
A22 
 
A1* 
A3 
 
A7* 
A20* 
 
C3 
 
C8 
C11 
 
C1 
C7 
 
Patient safety is never sacrificed to get the work done 
Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening 
It is just by chance that serious mistakes don’t happen around here 
We have patient safety problems in this ward/department 
Frequency of error reporting (outcome dimension) 
When an event occurs, but is caught and identified before affecting the patient, 
how often is it reported? 
When an event occurs, but it has no adverse outcome to the patient, how often 
is it reported? 
When an event occurs that could have an adverse outcome to the patient but 
does not, how often is it reported? 
Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety 
My supervisor/manager provides positive feedback when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient safety procedures 
My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety 
Whenever pressure build up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts 
My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen 
repeatedly 
Organisational learning – continuous improvement 
We are actively doing things to improve patient safety 
Mistakes have led to positive changes around here 
After we make changes to patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness 
Teamwork within units 
People support one another in this ward/department 
When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done 
In this ward/department, people treat each other with respect 
When one area in this ward/department gets busy, others help out 
Communication openness  
Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care 
Staff feel free to question the decisions and actions of those with more authority 
Staff are afraid to ask questions where something doesn’t seem right 
Feedback and communication about error 
We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
We are informed about events that happen in this ward/department 
  Table 1: Modified version of the HSOPC questionnaire 
Question 
Number 
Dimension/Item 
C9 
 
 
A19+ 
 
A15 
A26 
 
A2 
A12* 
A13 
A24 
 
F1+ 
F10 
F11 
 
 
F4* 
 
F13* 
 
F2* 
F7* 
 
F3* 
 
F5 
F9* 
 
F14 
In this ward/department, we discuss ways to prevent events from happening 
again 
Non-punitive response to error 
When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the 
problem 
Staff feel that their mistakes are held against them 
Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personal files 
Staffing  
We have enough staff to handle the workload 
Staff in this ward/department work longer hours that is best for patient care 
We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care 
We often work in “crisis mode” trying to do too much, too quickly 
Hospital management support for patient safety 
Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens 
Teamwork across hospital units 
There is good cooperation across hospital wards/departments that need to 
work together 
Hospital wards/departments work well together to provide the best care for 
patients 
Hospital wards/departments do not coordinate well with each other 
It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital wards/departments 
Hospital handoffs/transitions 
Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one 
ward/department to another 
Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes 
Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital 
wards/departments 
Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital 
________________________________________ 
*Item changed from original HSOPC questionnaire 
+
 Item not used in the questionnaire or discarded from the analysis  
  
 
 
Survey response and sample properties 
Four thousand questionnaires were distributed, of which 1,461 were returned (a 
37% response rate representing 12% of the total employees in the Trust).  Within 
these cases, 1017 respondents had given valid responses to the 40 HSOPC 
items subsequently analysed. Sixty percent of the sample were nursing staff 
(trained and untrained), followed by allied healthcare professionals (21%), 
 management and administrative staff (11%) and medical staff (8%); just under 
half the sample (45%) had been working in their current hospital for at least 5 
years. 
 
 
Analysis of data 
We first examined the responses made to each item within the 12 HSOPC 
dimensions, and assessed the original 12 dimension model in relation to our 
sample, both in terms of the internal consistency reliability of each dimensional 
grouping of items, and as a whole using confirmatory factor analysis to assess 
the overall level of fit. 
 
We then constructed the optimal measurement model for our sample to see if, 
and how this differed from the original model. Our sample was split randomly into 
two halves; on one “construction” half, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was 
used to construct a measurement model for the items; the other “validation” half 
of the data was then used to test this model via Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA). Having finalized our optimal model, we then performed reliability analysis 
on the sets of items in each resulting dimension using the whole sample. 
 
 
Results 
 
Item responses 
With the exception of two factors (i.e., hospital handover handoffs and 
transitions), the main findings were positive with regard to the type of safety 
culture within the Trust as a whole. Appendix 1 shows the percentage responses 
in each category reported for each item used in the survey. 
 
 
 Testing the original model 
The results of a reliability analysis on the original dimensions are presented in 
table 2. Of the 12 groupings of items, seven (Overall Perceptions of Safety, 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations, Organisational Learning – Continuous 
Improvement, Communication Openness, Non-punitive Responses to Error, 
Staffing, Hospital Management Support) fell short of an adequate level of internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha < 0.7), with Staffing exhibiting an extremely poor 
level of reliability (alpha = 0.58). Only two of the dimensions achieved alpha 
values above 0.80 (Frequency of Error Reporting, Feedback and Communication 
about Error). 
 
Table 2: HSOPC items in the UK data and their fit to the original 12 dimension model 
Dimension/Item Item 
R2 
from 
CFA† 
Standard 
Path 
Coefficient 
from CFA† 
Reliability 
of 
Dimension
‡ 
Overall perceptions of safety (outcome dimension)   0.67 
 
A25 Patient safety is never sacrificed to get the 
work done 
0.25 0.50  
A30 Our procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening 
0.33 0.58  
A18 It is just by chance that serious mistakes 
don’t happen around here 
0.45 0.67  
A28 We have patient safety problems in this 
ward/department 
0.37 0.60  
Frequency of error reporting (outcome dimension)   0.83 
 
D1 When an event occurs, but is caught and 
identified before affecting the patient, how 
often is it reported? 
0.45 0.67  
D2 When an event occurs, but it has no 
adverse outcome to the patient, how often 
is it reported? 
0.87 0.93  
D3 When an event occurs that could have an 
adverse outcome to the patient but does 
not, how often is it reported? 
0.59 0.77  
Supervisor/manager expectations and actions 
promoting patient safety 
  0.68 
B1 My supervisor/manager provides positive 
feedback when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety 
procedures 
0.54 0.73  
     
 Table 2: HSOPC items in the UK data and their fit to the original 12 dimension model 
Dimension/Item Item 
R2 
from 
CFA† 
Standard 
Path 
Coefficient 
from CFA† 
Reliability 
of 
Dimension
‡ 
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety 
0.68 0.82 
B3 Whenever pressure build up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts 
0.26 0.51  
B4 My supervisor/manager overlooks patient 
safety problems that happen repeatedly 
0.14 0.38  
Organisational learning-continuous improvement   0.66 
A14 We are actively doing things to improve 
patient safety 
0.45 0.67  
A16 Mistakes have led to positive changes 
around here 
0.30 0.55  
A22 After we make changes to patient safety, 
we evaluate their effectiveness 
0.45 0.67  
Teamwork within units   0.73 
A1 People support one another in this 
ward/department 
0.62 0.79  
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to get 
the work done 
045 0.67  
A7 In this ward/department, people treat each 
other with respect 
0.62 0.79  
A20 When one area in this ward/department 
gets busy, others help out 
0.23 0.48  
Communication openness   0.67 
C3 Staff will freely speak up if they see 
something that may negatively affect 
patient care 
0.51 0.72  
C8 Staff feel free to question the decisions 
and actions of those with more authority 
0.54 0.73  
C11 Staff are afraid to ask questions where 
something doesn’t seem right 
0.29 0.54  
Feedback and communication about error   0.80 
C1 We are given feedback about changes put 
into place based on event reports 
0.52 0.72  
C7 We are informed about events that 
happen in this ward/department 
0.54 0.74  
C9 In this ward/department, we discuss ways 
to prevent events from happening again 
0.64 0.80  
Non-punitive response to error   0.65 
A15 Staff feel that their mistakes are held 
against them 
0.81 0.90  
A26 Staff worry that mistakes they make are 
kept in their personal files 
0.28 0.53  
Staffing   0.58 
A2 We have enough staff to handle the 
workload 
0.34 0.59  
 Table 2: HSOPC items in the UK data and their fit to the original 12 dimension model 
Dimension/Item Item 
R2 
from 
CFA† 
Standard 
Path 
Coefficient 
from CFA† 
Reliability 
of 
Dimension
‡ 
A12 Staff in this ward/department work longer 
hours that is best for patient care 
0.17 0.41  
A13 We use more agency/temporary staff than 
is best for patient care 
0.09 0.30  
A24 We often work in “crisis mode” trying to do 
too much, too quickly 
0.54 0.74  
Hospital management support for patient safety   0.69 
F10 The actions of hospital management show 
that patient safety is a top priority 
0.54 0.73  
F11 Hospital management seems interested in 
patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens 
0.51 0.72  
Teamwork across hospital units   0.70 
F4 There is good cooperation across hospital 
wards/departments that need to work 
together 
0.43 0.66  
F13 Hospital wards/departments work well 
together to provide the best care for 
patients 
0.42 0.65  
F2 Hospital wards/departments do not 
coordinate well with each other 
0.50 0.70  
F7 It is often unpleasant to work with staff 
from other hospital wards/departments 
0.15 0.39  
Hospital handoffs and transitions   0.77 
F3 Things “fall between the cracks” when 
transferring patients from one 
ward/department to another 
0.51 0.72  
F5 Important patient care information is often 
lost during shift changes 
0.48 0.69  
F9 Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital 
wards/departments 
0.57 0.76  
F14 Shift changes are problematic for patients 
in this hospital 
0.29 0.54  
† N = 1017 
‡ Cronbach’s Alpha Statistic for internal consistency reliability, 1238 < N < 1412 
 
 
A CFA of the original model was then run (chi-square = 1907, 674 df); the full 
range of fit indices suggested a level of fit with marginal adequacy; specifically 
CFI = 0.91, NNFI = 0.89, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.05. Of the 40 items, 4 (A12, 
A13, B4 and B7) had less than 20% of their variability explained by the model, 
and a further 7 items had less than 30% of variability explained. In addition, of the 
 40 standardized path coefficients, 8 dropped below the widely applied 0.5 cut-off.  
 
Constructing an optimal model 
Having found that the original model did not fit the UK data satisfactorily, we then 
carried out a robust construction of the optimal measurement model for the 40 
HSOPC items in the UK survey. On one randomly selected “construction” half of 
the data we performed an EFA, using Principal Axis Factoring as the extraction 
method, and assessing the number of factors to be extracted by a combination of 
Kaiser’s criterion and Cattell’s screen plot method15. An oblique rotation was 
carried out to aid interpretation of the resulting factors. Having examined a series 
of possible models, and gradually removed 13 items which either severely cross-
loaded or had very low loadings and communalities, the evidence pointed most 
strongly towards a 9-factor model for the remaining 27 items. This accounted for 
66.8% of their total variance, and is given with the factor loadings in Appendix 2. 
 
We then tested the fit of this model to the other “validation” half of the dataset 
using CFA (chi-square = 588, 288 df). The fit indices suggested an adequate fit to 
the data, with CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.04. 
Furthermore, the model accounted for at least 20% of the variance of each item, 
and greater than 30% of the variance for all but 2 items. All but one of the factor 
loadings from the EFA and all 27standardized path coefficients from the CFA 
were above 0.5. 
 
The interpretations of the dimensions resulting from the optimal measurement 
model constructed and tested on the UK data were similar to those from the 
original model. Indeed, there still existed dimensions for “Communication 
openness”, “Feedback, frequency of event reporting”, “Non-punitive responses to 
error” and “Hospital handoffs and transitions”, which all formed as before. The 
dimensions for “Teamwork across units” and Teamwork within units” both 
dropped a single item, and the “Supervisor/manager expectations and actions 
 promoting patient safety” dimensions dropped two items. The most noticeable 
differences were the absence of “Organisational learning – continuous 
improvement” and “Hospital management support”, and the grouping of a subset 
of the items which previously formed the “Overall perceptions of safety” and 
“Staffing” dimensions into a single dimension. 
 
Finally, using the whole sample, reliability analyses were performed for each of 
the groups of items defined by this factor structure. These generally indicated 
suitable internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 for seven of the nine 
dimensions. Of the two dimensions that fell below this level, one was a 2-item 
scale, and both were among the five dimensions to survive unchanged from the 
original model (i.e. the weak reliability was not due to the form of our revised 
model). None of the scales gained improved consistency by dropping further 
items. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our findings differ from the results obtained within the USA. Whilst we might have 
expected the changes made to the UK questionnaire to have resulted in some 
differences, they are unlikely by themselves to explain the findings. The results 
from the spilt EFA and CFA indicate that the questionnaire may be measuring 
different constructs, or aspects of patient safety within the UK, as compared to 
the USA. For example, the optimal model derived from the UK data resulted in a 
dimension that linked “Overall perceptions of safety” and “Staffing”. This may 
have come about because of an increased tendency to associate staffing levels 
with safety within the UK as compared to the USA.  Similarly, it is possible that 
the items in the dimensions “Organisational learning – continuous improvement” 
and “Hospital management support for patient safety” may have been interpreted 
differently within a UK sample. Our findings indicate that national and health 
care-specific differences may limit the extent to which the HSOPC survey is 
 applicable outside of the USA. We would also point to the lack of cross-validation 
(EFA followed by CFA) in the USA dataset as indicating another potential flaw in 
the design and validation of the HOSPC questionnaire. The relatively higher 
values for the CFA fit indices achieved in the original study from which the 
HSOPC scales were constructed may be partially explained by their use of the 
same sample for the EFA and CFA. Split-half validation was not undertaken; and 
testing the model using the same data from which it was constructed would most 
likely result in an over-estimate of the degree of fit. 
 
The measurement of safety culture and climate in healthcare is still in a relatively 
immature stage of development as compared to other domains (e.g., offshore 
installations, manufacturing)16, 17. Other researchers3 have warned about the 
dangers of too readily generalising about safety culture and climate across 
industries with widely differing characteristics, forms of hierarchy and work 
practices. This is especially the case within health care, where hospitals for 
example, may vary greatly according to norms and operating procedures, even 
within the same Trust. Our findings add further weight to the argument that there 
is a need to further develop and construct theoretical models that are sensitive to 
the context-specific nature of health care environments including hospitals.18 
Without such work researchers run the risk of adopting a “broad brush” approach 
to safety culture and overgeneralising their findings.  
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